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The Rise of Islamism in Contemporary Syria
From Muslim Brotherhood to Salafi-Jihadi Rebels
ECATERINA CEPOI
Started initially in March 2011 as a popular revolt against the exclusive power 
of the Assad regime, following the protest movement model in other Arab countries, 
the Syrian Revolution gradually turns into a real civil war, failing into paroxysmal 
violence and rising militarization, dividing population but also the international 
community in two opposite camps. What characterizes this approximately two years 
period is, on one hand, the failure of a solution both military and political to the crisis 
and, on the other hand, a continuous process of Islamisation of the conflict (based on 
Sunni-Alawi differences), as a result of both endogenous attitudes and options and 
influence exerted by the regional environment. 
The present research aims to present the growth of political and militant Islam 
and its main representatives in Syria, starting with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
its temptation to conquer power, and then survive in the face of Ba’ath repressions, 
continuing with Assad regime’s own politics of instrumentalization of a part of Syrian 
or regional terrorist/Islamist groups for its own benefit. Finally, contesting events 
from 2011, a majority of rebel groups and brigades who are now fighting against 
Assad regime’s forces assume an identity and an explicit Sunni Islamic activism in 
multiple versions, ranging from moderate Islamism in the Muslim Brothers style, to 
the most radical forms of jihadi militancy. 
The Islamisation of the Syrian conflict produces a constant global preoccupation, 
as the widespread rise of groups which claim a political, social, axiological project 
in dissonance with the Western democratic model contributes all the more to 
the indecisions of the Western powers regarding the limits and the strategies of 
involvement in the Syrian problem. Many rebel groups, not only the Islamist ones, 
dependent on financing and support offered by regional Sunni powers, are often 
instrumentalized in the rivalries between their protectors (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar), affecting their unity and military efficacy. Likewise, the Damascus regime, 
although trying to officially stay away from a sectarian approach of the conflict, 
structurally identifies itself with the interests of the Alawite minority and its clients 
within other communities, being supported by its Shi’a allies (Iran, Hezbollah, Iraq). 
Muslim Brotherhood/Ba’ath Party Rivalry for Power
In Syria, as well as in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was one of the main 
opposition forces against the new secular regimes installed after the fifth and sixth 
decade. Advocating the implementation of Muslim values at social, juridical, even 
political level, an expression par excellence of Sunni milieu, the Brotherhood had to face 
a competing model – the secular nationalism (and pan-Arabism) developed by the 
Ba’ath party, after taking power in 1963. The Islamic movement was outlawed in 1964 
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and, after the Assad’s clan takeover, in 1970, it was definitively banished1. Recruiting 
its political and military elites to a great extent from the Alawite minority, the new 
regime perceives Brotherhood’s values and militancy as the main enemy of its stability 
and existence; all throughout the seventh decade, political repression was common. 
As a consequence, the Syrian Brotherhood fractured along two attitudes: a Damascus 
group, led by the historical ruler Isaam Attar that was open to a moderate attitude, 
whereas the groups in Aleppo and Hama, led by Abdel Fattah Abu Ghuddah, adopted 
a radical stand. In fact, there was a traditional rivalry between those two seed-plots of 
Sunny identity and bastions of traditionalism2, and Damascus, dominated by Alawite 
elites and by a movement of emigration from Alawite region towards Aleppo and 
Hama. On the backdrop of Brotherhood’s inconsistency, a new movement appeared, 
grafted onto the Hama branch, led by Marwan Hadeed; under the name of Fighting 
Vanguard (Talia al-Muquatila) it promoted a radical solution against the Assad regime. 
Arrested and killed in prison in 1975, Hadeed had, however, succeeded in setting 
up a militant trend attractive for young generations – some of them having been 
trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon or Jordan and who would participate later to 
a continuous confrontation with the power in Damascus. Violence spread especially 
after 1979, when the Fighting Vanguard attacked Ba’ath institutions or leaders: in 
the next decades, the car-bomb attacks became the hallmarks of the new resistance 
movements. 
In 1981, the various factions of the Brotherhood reconciled and endorsed, with 
the Fighting Vanguard as their effective instrument, a concrete fighting strategy for 
eliminating the Assad regime. But, once again, disputes, rivalries and suspicions 
fractured this temporary alignment: the new leader of the Fighting Vanguard, 
Adnan Uqlah, opposed the idea of building a political front by co-opting non-Islamic 
opposition movements as well. The Brotherhood split again along the traditional 
cleavage between Damascus and Aleppo-Hama3. In February 1982, members of the 
Hama’s Brotherhood joined the militants of the Fighting Vanguard in their attempt 
to start a rebellion intended to overthrow the regime. The insurrection was violently 
repressed by the Syrian military and security forces, especially by shelling the Hama 
neighborhoods controlled by rebels. A black stain on the Brotherhood’s history and 
of Islamic movement in general, as the Hama massacre led to the killing of over 
10.000 people; although the insurrection was led by the Fighting Vanguard and not 
by the Brotherhood, it remained linked to the latter’s name. Subsequent repression 
affected both the Fighting Squad (which was destroyed entirely by Syrian intelligence 
services – but its image remained a hallmark of militancy, its name being taken by 
one of the Islamic brigades4) and the Brotherhood’s capacity to assume an efficient 
1 Olivier CARRE, Gérard MICHAUD (Michel SEURAT), Les Frères Musulmans (1928-1982), 
L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001, pp. 123-203; Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Syria. Revolution from Above, 
Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 89-98; Radwan ZIADEH, Power and Policy in Syria. The Intelligence 
Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East, I.B. Tauris, London, 2011, 
pp. 129-156.
2 Itzchak WEISMANN, ”The Politics of Popular Religion: Sufis, Salafis, and Muslim 
Brothers in 20th-Century Hamah”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 37, no. 1, 
2005, pp. 39-58.
3 Hanna BATATU, ”Syria’s Moslem Brethen”, MERIP Report, no. 110, 1982, pp. 12-20.
4 Nora BENKORICH, ”La tentation de la lutte armée contre le pouvoir baasiste en Syrie. 
Passé (1976-1982) et présent”, Le Débat, vol. 1, no. 168, 2011, pp. 155-167.
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militancy inside Syria. A large part of its leaders and staff who have escaped the 
Ba’athist repressions flew the country, along with their traditional rivalries. The lack 
of unity and common strategy remained the common figure and contributed to the 
heterogeneity and inconsistency of the current Syrian National Council (replaced by 
the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces – or Syrian 
National Coalition, since November 2012).
Assad’ Politics on Terrorism and political Islam
Like many of the regimes in the Middle East, Ba’athist Syria has instrumented 
a series of radical movements throughout decades, for various political interests, at 
an international or regional scale1. If in the 70s and 80s, these were especially radical 
factions within the Palestinian movement, with a secular orientation (Abu Nidal, al-
Saiqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, etc.), in the 
1990s, Damascus tried to rally and use new Islamic movements and groups dominant 
in the region as a result of the ongoing Islamisation. This process started in the 1980s, 
when Syria offered constant political and military support to Hezbollah, in Lebanon, 
in competition and sometimes rivalry with Iran, the other protector of Lebanese Shiite 
movement. Hezbollah, as well as the Palestinian groups faithful to Damascus, were 
used as proxies for implementing Syria’s politics in Levant, to the extent that Lebanon 
became not only a traditional geopolitical obsession for the Syrian leaders, but also 
a source of an almost permanent conflict with the Organization for the Liberation of 
Palestine and Israel. In this geostrategic context, the Assad regime offered support both 
to the new Palestinian Islamist groups, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, and provided 
assistance (by harboring training camps for example) to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) and/or to the Iraqi Kurd parties. Controlled especially by the numerous Syrian 
intelligence services, the relations with the terrorist or opposition groups became a 
mark of Damascus, permanently accompanying its official politics and representing 
an instrument of pressure, blackmail, repression of dissidents in exile or of regional 
and international rivals2. 
The label of a state supporting terrorism that the US officially stuck to Damascus 
in 1979, was partially softened after the first Gulf War, when Syria’s participation 
in the anti-Saddam coalition temporarily improved the Western perception and 
nurtured the illusion of a change. In reality, even after the generation turnover, with 
Bashar al-Assad taking power in 2000, the old routines endured. The partnerships 
with the radical movements persisted, especially in the framework of deep regional 
changes and an increased role of the US in the Middle East. Consequently, the Syrian 
official diplomacy became more balanced and, correlatively, more eager to use non-
state actors as instruments for implementing its strategies. Lebanon remained the 
playground par excellence for the rivalry or competition between Syria and other 
1 Boaz GANOR, ”Syria and Terrorism”, Survey of Arab Affairs, vol. 28, Jerusalem Center 
for Public Affairs, 15 November 1991, pp. 1-8, http://jcpa.org/article/syria-and-terrorism-2/ 
(accessed: 12 August 2013)
2 Reuven ERLICH, ”State-Sponsored Terrorism: Terrorism as a Preferred Instrument 
of Syrian Policy”, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, vol. 10, October 2001, 
http://212.150.54.123/inter_ter/st_terror/syrian_terror.htm (accessed: 12 August 2013).
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regional (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel) or international powers (US, France) and only 
the massive reaction after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, in 2005, forced the Syrian 
military to retreat from Lebanon. 
Although it appealed to a communal type of loyalty (asabiyya – clan solidarity), the 
one provided by the Alawite identity, the Assad regime was structurally characterized 
by pragmatism, ideological flexibility, and the tendency to use all resources and 
partners available for pursuing its political or strategic interests1. This explains the 
support Damascus offered to Islamist movements, even those of Sunni filiation2; the 
Palestinian Jihad group Fatah al-Islam, formed in Lebanon in 20063 is an exemplary 
case in this respect. In May 2007, it waged a true war with Lebanese regulated forces, 
in order to control the refugee camp Nahr al-Bared in Tripoli4. Fatah al-Islam militants, 
as well as its founding leader, Shakir al-Abassi, have maintained private connections 
with the Syrian intelligence services, leading to a general image of the movement as 
being an instrument of Damascus. After 2008, however, a part of the group resolutely 
disowned Syrian leaders and even initiated several violent actions against them, 
anticipating the confrontations that started in 2011. Finally, the complicities between 
the Syrian regime and the jihadist networks became visible especially after 2003, 
when radical Sunni militants freely transited Syria to Iraq in order to fight against 
Western forces or the new post-Saddam Iraqi authorities. With the beginning of 
the conflict in Syria, in March 2011, the relations between Damascus and its former 
terrorist and Islamist clients became less and less clear. It is however obvious that the 
regime succeeded in maintaining an influence and in controlling part of the networks, 
especially the clandestine ones. Damascus used them either to infiltrate the large 
field of the opposition movements, or to orchestrate violent operations, especially 
in the public space, in order to validate the official version of the terrorist character 
of the rebellion. The release in 2012 of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri – one of the ideologues 
and militants of al-Qaida, who was in detention in Syria after arrest by the United 
States, in 20065 – and, along with him, of other tens of jihadist militants, mainly former 
combatants in Iraq, was notorious. In the same time, a certain distance or a change 
in the attitude of several terrorist groups and networks previously controlled by the 
Syrian intelligence services is visible. On the backdrop of civil conflict, their members 
have joined the resistance movements, most of them Islamist, and fought against the 
former protectors whose logistic capacities and intelligence resources they knew well. 
The Hamas headquarters in Damascus, which preferred to take its distance from a 
regime fighting now against a predominantly Islamist and Sunni opposition and 
to move to Qatar is probably the most noticeable case of desistance. Likewise, an 
1 Eberhard KIENLE, ”Entre jama’a et classe. Le pouvoir politique en Syrie contemporaine”, 
Revue du monde musulman et de la Méditerranée, vol. 59, no. 1, 1991, pp. 211-239.
2 Amir KULICK, Yoram SCHWEITZER, ”Syria and the Global Jihad: A Dangerous Double 
Game”, Strategic Assessment, vol. 11, no. 3, 2009, pp. 65-75; Ethan CORBIN, ”Lessons From the 
Interior: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Syria”, al-Nakhlah, Spring 2007.
3 Gary GAMBILL, ”The Rise of Fatah al-Islam”, Global Politician, October 7, 2007, http://
www.globalpolitician.com/default.asp?23075-lebanon (accessed: 12 August 2013).
4 Adam RAMADAN, ”Destroying Nahr el-Bared: Sovereignty and Urbicide in the Space 
of Exception”, Political Geography, vol. 28, 2009, pp. 153-163.
5 Murad Batal AL-SHISHANI, ”Syria’s Surprising Release of Jihadi Strategist Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri”, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 10, issue 3, February 10, 2012, pp. 5-6, February 10, 2012, http://
www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_010_Issue03.pdf (accessed: 12 August 2013).
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important number of Fatah al-Islam members found themselves among the ranks of 
rebel combatants after 2012. 
At the same time, after 2011, the power in Damascus doubled the official actions 
of the army, intelligence and security services against the protest movements and 
the contesting groups, by resorting to popular militias formed by militants that are 
unconditionally faithful to the regime1. Called shabiha (”ghosts”), they gained a dark 
public notoriety as a result of the excesses and pathological violence they manifested 
against the civilians in Sunni localities (the most known being in Houla – May 25, 
2012, and al-Qubair – June 6, 2012). In fact, shabiha are formed exclusively by Alawites, 
recruited among the traditional networks of smuggling and traffickers in the seaside 
region (Latakia, Banias, Tartous), protected by the regime, but also among the young 
generation, who found here not just the opportunity for earning more money, but 
also a way to acquire prestige and the possibility to exert violence in full impunity 
and in the name of the state2. Finally, under cover members of the intelligence service 
infiltrated the ranks of shabiha militias. They became a semi-clandestine instrument 
of the regime in order to destroy or induce fear in those groups having rallied the 
anti-ba’athist revolt. In 2012, shabiha groups were integrated in a new structure, the 
Jaysh al-Sha’bi; a significant support was given by the Iranian militia Bassidj and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah3. Exhibiting an indefectible attachment to the Alawite identity 
and practicing the confessional cleansing of Sunni localities in Northern regions (the 
Alawite country), shabiha has largely contributed to the sectarian division of the Syrian 
conflict, thus stirring the radical anti-Shiite attitudes of the Salafi-jihadi movement. 
Islamisation of Syrian Resistance
Increased militarization and an ever more salient religious character define the 
conflict between the Assad regime and the opposition groups, transforming it into a 
sectarian war4. Several factors explain the continuous Islamisation of the Syrian crisis: 
endogenous attitudes the rebels’ attachment to values, behaviors, Muslim identity 
brands; the influence of foreign powers like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, first and foremost; 
the impact of different ideologues and Islamist militants or international networks5. It 
is both an identity reorientation, on the background of dissolution of state landmarks 
and entities, and an existential reorientation, as turning towards religious norms may 
provide a meaning and comfort in a time of widespread and unleashed violence6. 
1 Joseph HOLLIDAY, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, Middle East 
Security Report 8, Institute for the Study of War, March 2013.
2 Yassin al-Haj SALIH, ”Syrian Shabiha and Their State”, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung – Middle 
East Office, April, 2012.
3 Karen DEYOUNG, Joby WARRICK, ”Iran and Hezbollah Build Militia Network in Syria, 
Officials Say”, Guardian Weekly, 12 February 2013.
4 Joseph HOLLIDAY, Syria’s Maturing Insurgency, Middle East Security Report 5, Institute 
for the Study of War, June 2012.
5 David SANGER, ”Rebel Arms Flow Is Said to Benefit Jihadists in Syria”, The New York Times, 
October 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/world/middleeast/jihadists-receiving-
most-arms-sent-to-syrian-rebels.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed: 12 August 2013).
6 ”The growing prominence of Islamist imagery is perhaps more due to its usefulness 
in Sunni identity politics, than to the ideology itself. Religion is not the driving force of the 
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Thus, the Islamisation affects both civilians and the rebels, especially in the regions 
where the Sunni traditional conservatism is strong, such as Homs, Idlib, and Aleppo. 
In this extremely complex and heterogeneous setup of the Syrian resistance, made of 
hundreds of military brigades and groups at all levels, from the national level to the 
grassroots of neighborhoods or villages, a few major tendencies can be identified1. 
First, there are militants and groups that may be called nationalist-religious; 
although they endorse an Islamic identity, they pursue secular goals (the overthrow 
of the Assad regime) and they embrace modern political values (i.e. nationalism, 
democracy, free elections, etc.). This category includes the largest part of the brigades 
of the Free Syrian Army (al-jaishal-souri al-hurr, FSA)2 and several autonomous groups, 
which recognize the authority of the FSA3. However, even though the FSA forms 
the majority of the Syrian military opposition, the political supremacy is disputed 
among the leaders in the country and those exiled abroad (Turkey). The permanent 
interference of rival foreign powers, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, has weakened 
the efficiency of the FSA and has affected its image. Thus, in various provinces (in 
FSA strategy, Syrian territory is divided into five zones, for a better coordination) 
the FSA brigades often end up taking part in common operations with the Islamist 
or even jihadist groups, the identity differences being far less important here than 
the pragmatic imperatives against the forces of the regime. In fact, the FSA label is 
often a simple hallmark, showing the attachment to a set of values and bringing some 
material advantages in money or equipment, rather than the effective integration 
into a military structure. In reality, the FSA is an umbrella for numerous groups (of 
more than 60.000 combatants) disseminated all over the Syrian territory, enjoying a 
large autonomy and following with their own commandants (the only ones which are 
respected and followed by the rebels), which are coordinated by different instances 
bringing together leaders in exile and the ones on the battle-field (Joint Command 
for the Revolution’s Military Council – in September 2012, replaced by the Supreme 
Military Command – after December 7, 2012)4. 
However, a large number of Syrian brigades and combatants claim an explicit 
Islamic identity and moreover, advocate an Islamist project combining the social 
values of Islam with the political categories of state, nation or even democracy. 
Democracy is validated by an Islamist reading where the traditional principles of 
Shura, collective deliberation, are seen as the Muslim version of the elective principle 
in Western democracies5. Even though the classical vocabulary and imagery of the 
Sunni Islamist movements (Jihad, the necessity of imposing the Shari’a, dress codes 
rebellion, but it is the insurgent movement’s most important common denominator. For Syria’s 
revolutionaries, Islam functions both as a ready-to-use ideological prism, a sectarian identity 
marker, and an effective mobilization tool in Sunni Muslim areas – and, of course, as a source 
of spiritual comfort in wartime”, Aron LUND, Syrian Jihadism, UI brief, no 13, Swedish Institute 
of International Affairs, 14 September, 2012, p. 11.
1 Fabrice BALANCHE, ”Géographie de la révolte syrienne”, Outre Terre, no. 29, 2011, 
pp. 437-458.
2 http://www.free-syrian-army.com/ (accessed: 12 August 2013)
3 Elizabeth O’BAGY, The Free Syrian Army, Middle East Security Report 9, Institute for the 
Study of War, March 2013.
4 Joseph HOLLIDAY, Syria’s Armed Opposition, Middle East Security Report 3, Institute for 
the Study of War, March 2012.
5 Nir ROSEN, ”Islamism and the Syrian Uprising”, Foreign Policy, March 8, 2012.
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and specific behaviors, etc.) are used, they are not integrated in the transnational Salafi-
jihadist current; they do not cultivate the idea of a sectarian conflict and manifest 
preoccupation for the social welfare. This approximates the traditional vision of the 
Muslim Brothers, reinterpreted in multiple forms, following the political perspectives 
and culture of the numerous Islamist groups currently active in Syria. Some recognize 
and even take part in the FSA operations while rejecting the FSA secular project and 
even criticizing the subservience to a leadership in exile, subject to foreign influences 
and Western interests. The most significant examples of brigades assuming a moderate 
Islamic identity, devoid of the ideological and practical excesses of Salafi-jihadism, 
are Liwa Suqour al-Sham (over 6000 combatants, in Idlib, but influent in the entire 
Northern province, and even in Aleppo)1, Farouk Battalion (Homs), Liwa Islam, Deirez-
Zour Revolutionary Council, Tawhid Brigade (Aleppo), Jund Allah Battalion (Homs), Ansar 
al-Islam (Damascus, a coalition of seven groups that were originally part of the FSA, 
forming the main military opposition force in the capital’s region)2, etc. In September 
2012, Liwa Suquor al-Sham and other Islamic groups founded a coalition, the Syrian 
Liberation Front3, led by Sheikh Ahmed Issa, the leader of Suqour al-Sham. Becoming 
aware of the urgency to build a united front against the Damascus regime, the SLF 
has maintained close relations with the FSA. Moreover, a part of its leaders are at the 
same time members of the new FSA coordination structure, the Supreme Military 
Command. 
One of the most important Islamic rebel groups is Liwa al-Umma, active in the 
Idlib province, but also in Homs and Aleppo4. Counting more than 3.000 combatants, 
the group is led by Mahdi al-Harati, an Irish-Libyan Islamist who was one of the 
most important leaders of anti-Qaddafi militias in Tripoli, in 2011. He crossed the 
border to Syria together with other combatants, setting up one of the most efficient 
and successful brigades in the anti-Assad coalition. Benefitting from the essential 
support of Qatar, Liwa al-Umma includes a series of specialists in heavy artillery, 
communications and logistics. Without adhering to the Salafite ideology (although 
al-Harati has asserted his preference for an Islamic government in a post-Assad Syria), 
the movement attracts an important number of foreign fighters5. 
Finally, there is a nebula of Islamic movements which can be covered by the 
generic term of Salafi-jihadists: tens of brigades and groups, some of them strictly 
local, others with a regional and even national dimension, and attached, in various 
degrees, to the transnational networks and movements. Here too, there is a multiplicity 
of ideological positions and loyalties as well as a variety of strategic and military 
options. The militarization of the conflict, the increased sectarian dimension (Sunnis 
vs. Alawites), but also of the influence of foreign radical Islamist milieu, which 
finds in the Syrian conflict a fertile ground for recruiting, mobilizing, financing and 
1 http://www.shamfalcons.net/ (accessed: 12 August 2013).
2 ”Ansar al-Islam Joins Forces with FSA”, October 9, 2012, http://www.liveleak.com/
view?i=d55_1349824408 (accessed: 12 August 2013).
3 http://syrialiberationfront.com/ (accessed: 12 August 2013).
4 http://www.youtube.com/user/Liwaalummah?feature=watch; https://www.facebook.
com/alommah.brigade (accessed: 12 August 2013).
5 Mary FITZGERALD, ”The Syrian Rebels’ Libyan Weapon”, Foreign Policy, August 9, 
2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/09/the_syrian_rebels_libyan_weapon 
(accessed: 12 August 2013).
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implementing its projects1 made the Jihadist motives and the Salafi identity more and 
more salient. From an ideological perspective, the Salafi-jihadi movements share a 
common set of theological and political visions: the centrality of Jihad as the best 
way for building a new Islamic order, purified of illegitimate values and powers; the 
contestation of cultural, social, political, democratic normativity, in the name of an 
Islamic supremacy; the ideal of the resurrection of an Islamic caliphate, at the scale of 
the entire ‘Umma, erasing national separations (cleavages?), etc2. 
Syrian Salafi-jihadi conglomerate is extremely heterogeneous. Often, using this 
identity stirs from the bare necessity to give an identifiable status in the vast field 
of the Syrian opposition groups. Many lack the capacity or the will to implement 
effectively a Salafi program and adopt only the external signs and symbols (black flag 
with white inscriptions, long beard, ethical and social conservatism, etc.)3. Likewise, 
one can distinguish between the ”nationalist” Salafists and the ”internationalist” ones. 
Although the latter adhere to the Salafist doctrine and ethos, they have a strategic 
projection at the national level, anchored in the local specificities and advocating for 
an Islamic Syria. Those groups, like the Ahrar al-Sham movement, are often formed by 
radicalized young Sunni, lacking a solid theological-juridical culture, living in areas 
destroyed by the armed conflict and ready to identify in the Salafi conservatism and 
in Jihad a model to follow.
On the other hand, there are brigades and groups which willingly endorse the 
label Salafiya-jihadiya and strive to extend the Syrian conflict to the whole Muslim 
space, considering the fight against the Assad regime as an element in a more 
generic battle against the apostate, illegitimate regimes and against the Western 
powers. Those groups recruit Syrian Islamist militants who have gained military 
experience in various external conflicts (in Iraq or Afghanistan) and, also, co-opt and 
integrate foreign jihadists for whom Syria is the new cause to fight for, after Iraq’s 
model between 2003 and 2007. Foreign volunteers represent just a small fraction of 
the entire Syrian opposition (between 800 and 2000 people). However, their military 
experience in terrorist operations, their commitment to Salafi-jihadi values and the 
financial and logistic support they enjoy from different Muslim networks, especially 
in the Gulf, makes them particularly important4. Extremely visible and present in the 
media, author of a large number of spectacular operations against the Assad regime, 
including terrorist attacks, causing numerous civilian victims, they are less interested 
in the local motivations of the anti-Ba’ath revolution, and often pursue their own 
agenda. The Syrian crisis is perceived only as a new opportunity for the Jihad which 
is the very central reason of their organizational and activist identity. Moreover, as an 
echo of a larger regional trend, they induce a sectarian dimension within the Syrian 
crisis, contesting not just the dominance of the Alawite elites in power, but also their 
Islamic legitimacy, in the name of traditionalist Sunnism, Hanbalite manner. Profiting 
1 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, 
Middle East Report No. 131, 12 October 2012, pp. 4-6.
2 Thomas HEGGHAMMER, ”Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics 
in the Study of Militant Islamism”, in Roel MEIJEL (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s  New Religious 
Movement, Columbia University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 244-266.
3 Elizabeth O’BAGY, Jihad in Syria, Middle East Security Report 6, Institute for the Study 
of War, September 2012.
4 Aaron ZELIN, ”Foreign Fighters Trickle into the Syrian Rebellion”, Policy Watch 1950, 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 11, 2012.
557
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. XIII • no. 3 • 2013
The Rise of Islamism in Contemporary Syria
from the porosity of the frontier, foreign jihadists enter especially from Northern 
Lebanon (the privileged route for the traffic of arms, provisions, resources), Southern 
Turkey (Antalya became the epicenter of volunteers heading towards Syrian territory) 
and Iraq, where the old Islamist networks now facilitate a reverse process of militants 
migration. Statistically, the majorities of the militants are Lebanese, Tunisians, Saudis, 
and Kuwaitis or even from Caucasus, Central Asia, or Europe1. However, from an 
ope rational point of view, the collaborative configuration of various operations 
transcends the ideological differences. Often, the jihadist brigades and militias 
participate in common actions with the FSA or the classical Islamic groups. In fact, the 
realities of the conflict impose the pragmatic solidarity of the rebels, without erasing 
the rivalries and the dissonances among them; they are, however, a lot less motivated 
by doctrinal disputes, and more by the imperatives multiple particular problems 
induced by concrete management of daily life and military actions in a generalized 
and violent war. 
Following a more general trend of reorganization within the Syrian military 
opposition, on December 21st 2012, a part of the Salafi-jihadi brigades announced the 
formation of a Syrian Islamic Front (SIF)2, in reply to the new Islamist structure of the 
Syrian Liberation Front. The SIF advocates the creation of a theocratic Syrian state, 
ruled by the Shari’a, led not by as a caliphate, but by a Shura Council. More pragmatic 
than fundamentalist, the new Islamist front is aware of the necessity of a military 
cooperation with the rest of the opposition forces, which explains its availability 
to maintain the contacts and the collaboration with the Supreme Military Council 
and the Syrian Liberation Front. The SIF assembles thousands of experienced and 
well-motivated rebels and militants, which makes it an unstoppable actor on the 
Syrian scene. Moreover, it breeds constant anxieties and worries, especially at the 
international level, regarding the increasing importance of the Jihad brigades in the 
Syrian conflict and the part they would play in a post-Assad Syria3. Among numerous 
groups which have been integrated in the SIF, one can evoke especially Ahrar 
al-Sham4, which rallies the largest part of foreign Jihadists, active in the Northern part 
of Syria – especially Idlib, Hama, Aleppo, promoting a relatively moderated Salafism 
with national tendencies, with close relations to the ground units of the FSA, with 
whom they occupied the Taftanaz airbase in January 20135; Harakat al-Fajr al-Islamiyya, 
1 Noman BENOTMAN, Emad NASERALDIN, The Jihadist Network in the Syrian Revolution. 
A Strategic Briefing, Quilliam Foundation, 2012, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/
wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-jihadist-network-in-the-syrian-revolution.pdf 
(accessed: 12 August 2013).
2 https://www.facebook.com/Islamic.Syrian.Front (accessed: 12 August 2013); Aron 
LUND, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front, UI Occasional Papers 17, 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, March 2013.
3 Aaron ZELIN, ”The Syrian Islamic Front: A New Extremist Force”, Policy Watch 2031, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 4, 2013.
4 http://www.ahraralsham.com/ (accessed: 12 August 2013); Chris ZAMBELIS, ”Ahrar 
al-Sham: A Profile of Northern Syria’s al-Qaeda Surrogate”, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 11, issue 7, 
April 4, 2013, pp. 4-5, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_011_Issue07_02.pdf 
(accessed: 12 August 2013).
5 Andrew TABLER, Jeffrey WHITE, Aaron ZELIN, ”Fallout from the Fall of Taftanaz”, 
Policy Watch 2015, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 14, 2013.
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active in Aleppo and its region1; Liwa al-Haqq from Homs, the second movement in 
importance in the SIF whose ideological leader is the renowned Salafi cleric Sheikh 
Abu Ratib, who constantly pleads for the creation of an Islamic state in Syria2; al-Iman 
Combat Brigades in Damascus and Suqour al-Islam in the province of Damascus, Ansar 
al-Sham Brigades in the province of Latakia; Jeish al-Tawhid in Deirez-Zour province, etc. 
Additionally, one can mention a series of radical factions, often led by foreign jihadists, 
who operate in a violent manner, without being integrated in the larger cooperation 
structures initiated by the great Islamist brigades: Majlis Shura al-Mujahedin, a small 
extremist group from province of Aleppo, formed especially by foreign jihadists and 
Syrian expats, contested even by the rest of Islamic or rebel movements for its radical 
attitude3; Jund al-Sham, led by Lebanese jihadists, acting at the Northern border with 
Lebanon4; Kataeb al-Muhajerin in the Aleppo region, an association of several jihadist 
groups formed by foreign combatants; or Kataeb al-Ansar from Homs. 
Finally, the most controversial Salafi-jihadi group in Syria and the one who 
received the largest media cover is Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham (Support Front for 
the People of Syria) or in brief Jabhat al-Nusra(JN)5. Created in January 2012, the 
movement, which fights for a global Islamic caliphate ruled by the Shari’a, shares 
several major points of the al-Qaida classical ideology6. Led by Abu Muhammad 
al-Golani, JN initially acted in the region of Damascus, and later extended to Aleppo, 
Deirez-Zourand Ar-Raqqa. In one year, it carried out more than 600 attacks on Syrian 
territory, among which 40 were suicide attacks. Its rapid emergence, its clandestine 
character, the access it enjoys to information and the vital objectives of the regime, 
its capacity to initiate sophisticated operations with a large destructive potential, 
have raised suspicion concerning the real nature of the JN, seen by some as a creature 
of the Assad intelligence services in order to comfort the official version about the 
terrorist character of the Syrian rebellion7. It is certain that the initial JN nucleus built 
around al-Golani in the proximity of Homs counted numerous former members of 
groups active in Iraq and Lebanon and financed or controlled by the Syrian power. 
After March-April 2012, it co-opted militants from the Palestinian (Fatah al-Islam) 
and Lebanese Jihadist groups, connected with the Syrian authorities and al-Qaida 
networks, as well as with former members of the Iraqi Abu Musab al-Zarkawi 
network. Later, as the operational field extended towards the East, in Deirez-Zour 
province, JN rallied various Islamist circles in the area, former combatants in Iraq or 
1 Jeffrey BOLLING, Rebel Groups in Northern Aleppo Province, Institute for the Study of War, 
August 29, 2012.
2 http://www.l-al7aq.com/ (accessed: 12 August 2013).
3 http://jihadology.net/category/other-groups/majlis-shura-al-mujahidin-fi-aknaf-bayt-
al-maqdis/ (accessed: 12 August 2013).
4 Radwan MORTADA, ”Khaled Mahmoud: A Prisoner in Lebanon Turns Emir in Syria”, 
Alakhbar English, January 4, 2013, http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/khaled-mahmoud-
prisoner-lebanon-turns-emir-syria (accessed: 12 August 2013).
5 Noman BENOTMAN, Roisin BLAKE, Jabhat al-Nusra. A Strategic Briefing, Quilliam Foun-
dation, 2012, http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/
free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf (accessed: 12 August 2013).
6 http://jalnosra.com/vb/ (accessed: 12 August 2013).
7 Mohammed AL SHAFEY, Paula ASTATIH, ”FSA and Islamists Express Doubts about Al-Nusra 
Front”, el-Sharq el-Aswat, March 22, 2012, http://m.asharq-e.com/content/1332433070978640300/
Top%20Stories (accessed: 12 August 2013).
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new Iraqi jihadist militants, some of them former or current members of al-Qaida in 
Iraq or of its avatar, the Islamic State of Iraq. Beyond this nebulous connection with 
the Syrian authorities, the activism against the regime has been proven by numerous 
spectacular attacks (e.g. car bombs) against the state institutions and leaders. Well 
organized, practicing strict criteria for recruitment and training, well financed, 
enrolling foreign or local jihadists with significant military experience, with cells 
and actions in the main centers of the Syrian resistance (the number of its members 
is estimated at over 5.000, at the beginning of 2013), JN succeeded in attracting the 
sympathy of both militants and rebels1. Moreover, JN strove to improve its public 
image tainted initially by the significant number of civilian victims of its operations, 
by focusing on military targets and the direct confrontation with the Syrian forces. JN 
acts almost always independently. However, occasionally, it may have collaborated 
with other rebel groups in important operations, such as the attack on the Taftanaz 
airbase near Aleppo. In the overall picture of the Syrian jihadist movements, Jabhat al-
Nusra succeeded in maintaining a distinct image, playing on the double ambiguity of 
its relations with the Syrian services and the international terrorist networks, mainly 
al-Qaida. Therefore, in December 2012, the US put JN on the list of Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, a controversial decision, criticized by a part of the Syrian opposition 
groups, who accused Washington of backing up the official story of the Ba’ath 
regime regarding the terrorist nature of the rebellion2. In a statement from April 2013, 
the Islamic State of Iraq, the brand of the al-Qaida branch from Iraq, has issued a 
declaration by means of which it designated JN as its branch in Levant; in a statement 
from April 2013 that disturbed the international community, the Islamic State of Iraq 
declared JN its branch in Levant; al-Golani has nuanced the statement, which has 
immediately provoked chills in the international circles, asserting that his group is 
separated from ISI, but it recognizes the authority of the al-Qaida leader, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri3. 
Conclusions
The evolution of the Syrian conflict and of its actors is difficult to anticipate. In the 
wave of the Arab revolutions started in 2011, the Syrian trajectory was very special: 
what started as a pacifist contestation of an autocratic regime and as a request for social 
and economic equity and for democracy, quickly degenerated into a horrendous war 
with more than 110.000 victims, massive destructions, 4.25 million people internally 
displaced, and at least 2 million refugees. Assad’s decision to make use of force was 
the major factor that led to the militarization of the opposition, following a recurrent 
tendency in the region, especially in conflict areas, that favored the rise of Islamic 
symbols and references. Without being complete, the continuous Islamisation of the 
Syrian revolt affects a considerable part of the combatants. It carries along the imagery 
1 Elizabeth O’BAGY, Jihad in Syria, cit., pp. 31-37.
2 Aaron ZEILIN, ”Rally Round the Jihadist”, Policy Analysis, The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, December 11, 2012.
3 Mushreq ABBAS, ”Jabhat al-Nusra Declares Allegiance to al-Qaeda”, al-Monitor, April 
10, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/al-qaeda-jabhat-al-nusra-
merge.htm (accessed: 12 August 2013).
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and the warrior ethos produced by a militant Islam: keeping up with a regime that does 
not hesitate to use disproportionate violence without any concern for the protection 
of the civilians, many combatants adopt violence as the only remaining solution: 
a violence legitimated not only by the imperative of survival, but also upgraded 
theologically in the form of the armed jihad (jihad bilsayf) against an heretic power. The 
increasing importance of Islamic references, especially the ones of Salafi-jihadi groups 
is a challenge for the West and for its position toward post-Assad Syria. Therefore, 
most Western powers expressed their doubts about the opportunity of arming the 
Syrian military opposition, fearing that those weapons would fall in the hands of 
radical groups hostile to democracy. Despite their proven efficiency on the ground, 
pushing away the Ba’ath forces in numerous regions, by their ideology, their number 
and their strategic multiplicity, the Islamist groups will be one of the main sources 
for insecurity and political instability The predicaments in Iraq and Afghanistan may 
give a glimpse of the future Syria where the war between the Assad regime and the 
Syrian opposition would be replaced by an explosion of internal conflicts opposing 
various groups and leaders, driven by ideological, economical, power rivalries, in a 
fragile, or even wrecked state. Militant and political Islam has made a decisive entry 
into Syria and, although its future remains uncertain, it will be part of any further 
evolution.
